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DD/A 81-1585/6

3 September 1981

3 SEP 1981

DD/A REGISTRY

FILE: 04M-2-10

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

FROM: Harry E. Fitzwater
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: Draft Office of Security Inspection Report

REFERENCE: Memo dtd 29 Jul 81, to DDA from A/IG, same Subject

Forwarded herewith, per your request, are comments submitted by the
Director of Security on Subject report.

Attachment



EO/DDA [] ba(3Sep81)

Distribution:

- 0 - Adse w/att
- ~~1~~ - DDA Subj w/att
- 1 - DDA Chrono w/o att
- 1 - HEF Chrono w/o att
- 1 - EO Chrono w/o att

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1. <i>EO/DOA</i>		<i>[Signature]</i> 31 AUG 1981
2. <i>ADDA</i>		<i>[Signature]</i> 9-1
3. <i>DOA</i>		<i>[Signature]</i>
4.		
5.		
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SECRET**ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET****SUBJECT:** (Optional)

Draft Office of Security Inspection Report

FROM**EXTENSION****NO.**

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Director of Security
4E60 Hqs

DATE

31 AUG 1981

25X1

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)**DATE****OFFICER'S INITIALS****COMMENTS** (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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1. DDA
7D18 Hqs

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4. IG
6E19 Hqs

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Attached is the Office of
Security response to the
draft IG report of the
Office of Security.

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DD/A Registry
81-1585/5

31 AUG 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

VIA: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM: [REDACTED]
Director of Security

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SUBJECT: Draft Office of Security Inspection Report

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 29 July 1981, which requested comments on the "accuracy and substance" of the draft inspection report before it is forwarded to the DCI and the DDCI. The report has been reviewed within the Office of Security, and every effort has been made to be both constructive and dispassionate in preparing the response. In addition to the general impressions set forth in this memorandum, the response includes comments on the substantive recommendations (Appendix A) and an errata supplemented by exposition (Appendix B).

2. The text of subject report also contains numerous suggestions which will be given appropriate and serious consideration but, for the most part, these items are not addressed in this reply. This memorandum also addresses a number of general issues which are highlighted in the draft inspection report.

3. The report presses the theme that the Office of Security has a large number of relatively young, inexperienced officers who are serving in such diverse sensitive areas as [REDACTED] Clearance Division, and the Security Duty Office. Senior Security management is acutely aware of this inexperience. I made it a particular point to cover this issue in my initial session in July 1980 with Inspector General representatives. In 1980 I also arranged for the Deputy Director for Human Resources, Planning and Information, Office of Personnel, to prepare a five-year projection on the professional age distribution of this Office. The basic message was that 50 percent of the total professionals are below age 40, which is unusually high, but the age profile anticipated over the next five years is relatively evenly distributed from age 25 through 54, which is favorable for smooth career progressions. Therefore, the problem will diminish rather than intensify. In the meantime, we have a well-structured program for bringing on board promising and talented young candidates who, in our judgment, are on a par with Career Trainee applicants and face the same close screening. The point of this is that we have been doing and are doing everything possible to address the age/experience issue.

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4. The inspection report is replete with criticism in the area of automation. In responding to this it should be pointed out that in January 1980 this Office generated a formal request to the Office of Data Processing for a feasibility study of automation for the domestic field office operations. This resulted in an excellent ODP report in August 1980 and the assignment of a highly qualified computer specialist on a two-year rotational tour as of 1 June 1981. The Office of Security long-range planning estimates call for implementation of three pivotal data processing, word processing, and communications initiatives in the next five years. The Office has requested accelerated funding for these important programs. This Office has turned a corner on this matter. Our personnel are genuinely interested in automation, and the ODP representative is a superb officer who is maintaining momentum which was started prior to the arrival of the Inspector General Team. The descriptive portrayals in the inspection report are, therefore, somewhat misleading and incomplete.

5. The inspection report contains the recommendation that the Personnel Security and Investigations Directorate be reorganized so that investigative and adjudicative tasks could be separated. This would be a step in the wrong direction and take the Office back to the 1960's. Such a separation existed in the Office of Security for many years, prior to a general reorganization in 1973, when a strenuous effort was made to combine functions, streamline operations, and save manpower. The Office's organizational plan was submitted to the Inspector General, who expressed his position in a memorandum dated 30 May 1973:

"The reorganization proposed by the Director of Security is a substantial improvement over the existing organization. It achieves a grouping of similar functions under common supervision that is markedly lacking in the current structure. Especially noteworthy is the placement of all personnel security functions, including the investigative process, under a single manager. . . Finally, a number of functions have been combined or reduced, making possible the elimination of several organizational elements, particularly at the staff level. This has reduced the number of supervisors, including the number reporting directly to the Director of Security, and has made possible a significant reduction in the total Office of Security position requirements.

"We, thus, endorse these features of the reorganization plan, and we commend the Director of Security for his initiative and for the thorough study of the Office of Security that preceded the drafting of the reorganization proposals."

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6. The inspection report takes up the cry for the movement and indicates that arguments were similarly advanced in the 1973 IG Report. It is the position of this Office that the inspection report misses the mark and presents an inaccurate picture of the actual situation. First, the matter is under continuing review, and the former Director of Security went into considerable detail on the topic in responding to the Office of the Inspector General in late 1978. Second, an Organizational Review Committee in the Office of Security assessed the situation

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7. The inspection report contains the recommendation that we establish a new adjudication procedure and that there be some delegation of authority for disapprovals to a lower level. For quite a number of years now, it has been a cornerstone of our adjudication policy that only the Director of Security can security disapprove anyone for Agency employment or affiliation. This has been fundamental and it has served the Agency extremely well, both in Agency forums and in testimony before Congressional committees. My predecessors and I have taken this responsibility very seriously. It would seem to be very short-sighted to make any significant changes in the adjudication process, particularly in the face of the youth/inexperience problem within the Clearance Division, and the September 1979 Staff Report of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, which categorized our security clearance procedures to be "the most comprehensive and stringent in the intelligence community." We can make and have made minor adjustments in our appraisal procedures; fine tuning is acceptable, but we would argue strongly against any major overhaul in the system.

8. I share the concerns expressed in the report regarding the incidents of theft in Agency buildings, the behavior of the char force and the performance of the Guard Force. To be sure, when isolated incidents are focused upon in a single report, they tend to cascade one upon the other and portray a distorted view of the overall situation. Nevertheless, we will move vigorously, and are already doing so, to strengthen our supervision of the Escort Program. We will re-double our coordination efforts with the Federal Protection Service to achieve better supervision of the guards and are also initiating a specially tailored security awareness briefing program for the guards. Concomitantly, we are phasing in staff employee replacements of the Federal Protective Officers in those posts not requiring powers of arrest. As the FPO force is reduced, we expect the quality of those officers remaining at CIA to rise. Lastly, a vastly improved closed circuit television system will be obtained with FY 81 funds and should result in improved physical security of the premises, particularly the loading docks, which are believed to be avenues of egress for stolen property.

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
9. The report persistently implies that the Office of Security fails to afford sufficient attention to counter-intelligence issues or may subordinate counterintelligence concerns because of preoccupation with production and suitability issues. In essence, this is an indictment of priorities and quality control with which I must take strong exception. The Office's counterintelligence responsibility is discharged through background investigations, special inquiries, polygraph and adjudication, all approached with a primary emphasis on avoiding penetration. In defending against penetration operations, it is clearly necessary to focus on certain lifestyle issues since they are the key to exploitation of intelligence personnel. The report also contains several comments that the pressure of a heavy work load might result in "cutting corners" at the expense of proper attention to counterintelligence matters. Such speculation is completely unsupported. Slippage on some deadlines, precisely because derogation of quality will not be tolerated, has been necessary.

10. The report suggests that the present Chief, Safety Group, is not professionally qualified to be the CIA Safety Officer. This is unfounded. The current Chief, Safety Group, has 19 years of experience in the safety field and has attended numerous training courses applicable to this discipline. I would add that the Deputy Chief is also a seasoned safety officer with 14 years of experience plus appropriate training.

11. The Office of Security certainly made every effort to cooperate with the inspectors in the course of the 1978 study of [redacted] and I have similarly tried to be helpful in this more recent comprehensive review which has now extended over a 12-month period, since meeting the Inspector General Team in July 1980.

12. I would sincerely appreciate it if my comments and observations would be attached to the inspection report when it is forwarded to the DCI and DDCI.

Attachment



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APPENDIX A

COMMENTS ON RECOMMENDATIONS

OFFICE OF SECURITY

INSPECTOR GENERAL DRAFT REPORT- 1981

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Next 25 Page(s) In Document Denied